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Abstract 
This paper analyses the attractiveness of the EU’s Blue Card Directive – the flagship of the EU’s 
labour immigration policy – for so-called ‘highly qualified’ immigrant workers from outside the EU. 
For this purpose, the paper deconstructs the understanding of ‘attractiveness’ in the Blue Card 
Directive as shaped by the various EU decision-making actors during the legislative process. It is 
argued that the Blue Card Directive sets forth minimum standards providing for a common floor – 
not a common ceiling: the Directive did not, as originally envisaged by the European Commission, 
create one European highly skilled admission scheme. This raises questions regarding its concrete 
use. A critical focus is placed on the personal scope of the Blue Card Directive and the level of rights 
offered, and a first comparative perspective on the implementation of the Directive in five member 
states is provided.  
 
 
This study was originally commissioned in the framework of the NEUJOBS research project 
financed by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme 
(http://www.neujobs.eu/). Its objective is to analyse likely future developments in the 
European labour market(s), in view of four major transitions that will impact employment 
– particularly certain sectors of the labour force and the economy – and European societies 
in general. 
CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe offer the views and critical reflections of 
CEPS researchers and external collaborators on key policy discussions surrounding the 
construction of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses 
policy-oriented and interdisciplinary academic studies and commentary about the internal 
and external implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies inside Europe and elsewhere 
throughout the world. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable 
only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are 
associated. This publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form for non-profit 
purposes only and on the condition that the source is fully acknowledged.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade the EU and its member states have made major efforts to introduce a novel European 
scheme for labour immigration. In the 2009 Stockholm Programme, the EU Heads of State and Government 
recognised that labour immigration can contribute to economic vitality and called for the creation of flexible 
admission systems that are responsive to the priorities and volumes (number of people admitted)  set by each 
member state. Under the Europe 2020 Strategy, the EU’s ten-year growth strategy, the European 
Commission stressed the promotion of a forward-looking and comprehensive labour migration policy that 
responds in a flexible way to the needs of member states’ labour markets with a view to raising employment 
levels.
1 This corresponds with the 2000 Lisbon Strategy that aimed for the EU to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.
2 In a speech on 9 May 2013, the European 
Commissioner for home affairs, Cecilia Malmström, emphasised that Europe needed skilled people in order 
to grow.
3 While acknowledging the tough economic times, the Commissioner highlighted the serious labour 
market shortages on the one hand and the untapped pool of skills and talents of migrants on the other.
4 
Stimulating the immigration of highly qualified workers from third countries to the EU member states forms 
a cornerstone of the envisaged EU labour immigration policy.
5 To this end, the EU legislator adopted in 2009 
the so-called EU ‘Blue Card Directive’, which aims to introduce strong incentives for non-EU workers to 
enter the EU for the purpose of highly qualified employment.
6 In the explanatory memorandum to the Blue 
Card Directive, the Commission indicated three elements as to why 
the EU as a whole [...] seems not to be considered attractive by highly qualified professionals in a 
context of very high international competition [...]. The attractiveness of the EU compared to such 
countries [USA and Canada] suffers from the fact that at present highly qualified migrants must face 
27 [now 28] different admission systems (1), do not have the possibility of easily moving from one 
country to another for work (2), and in several cases lengthy and cumbersome procedures (3) make 
them opt for non-EU countries granting more favourable conditions for entry and stay.
7 
                                                      
* Katharina Eisele is Researcher in the Justice and Home Affairs research unit at the Centre for European Policy 
Studies. She would like to thank the policy-makers who gave their time and attention to be interviewed for this paper as 
well as Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild for substantial comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The paper was drafted 
within the framework of the NEUJOBS research project, which aims to analyse future possible developments of the 
European labour markets. 
1 European Commission Communication, COM(2010) 2020, 3.3.2010, p. 18. 
2 Lisbon European Council Conclusions of 23/24.3.2000. 
3 Speech delivered by C. Malmström at the State of the Union Conference on 9 May 2013, “Europe should give 
migrants the opportunities they deserve”, SPEECH/13/399. 
4 Ibid. 
5 “EU labour immigration policy” as understood in the EU treaties as conditions of entry and residence for third-country 
nationals (see Article 79 TFEU).  
6 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
7 European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637, 23.10.2007, 
p. 3; the Commission described the “status quo” in the following way: “Member States’ immigration policies widely 2 | KATHARINA EISELE 
 
The Commission hints here at the question of the ‘effectiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive. Put differently – 
in positive terms – the Commission made clear that the EU’s main attractiveness compared to its competitors 
is the possibility now of accessing 28 labour markets, and thus to grow professionally while responding to 
EU companies’ concrete needs.
8 For this to become a reality, “EU action establishing a common system for 
admitting such workers is indispensable.” Common action would ensure that “these workers: 
•  are admitted under common rules; 
•  enjoy the same level of rights throughout the EU; 
•  will have the possibility of moving from one member state to another so as to adapt and respond 
promptly to fluctuating demands for highly qualified migrant labour; 
•  are fully integrated into the EU.”
9 
This paper seeks to assess and deconstruct the understanding of ‘attractiveness’ of the EU Blue Card 
Directive as framed by the different EU decision-makers throughout the legislative process and by the 
member states during the implementation phase.  
The paper argues that:  
-  The ‘attractiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive was from the very beginning subject to the interests of 
the different institutional actors involved – this approach  has arguably ignored the interests of businesses 
and the individual immigrants who still may have to face a slow and weighty bureaucracy (despite the 
objective of creating fast-track and flexible procedures with the Directive
10). 
-  The Blue Card Directive does not meet the Commission’s original aim to do away with 28 different 
national systems for highly qualified migrant workers, and can therefore merely be regarded as an 
upgraded national residence and work permit. 
-  The flexibility as to what ‘highly qualified employment’ means has to a certain extent been compromised 
in the final text of the Blue Card Directive. This goes hand in hand with the insertion of the many ‘may-
clauses’ that provide the member states with wide discretion and, as a consequence, reduce the 
‘attractiveness’ as initially framed by the Commission. 
-  The ‘attractiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive was affected by the dynamics evidenced in the decision-
making process: the Directive was adopted in a period of transition, namely seven months prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The new Treaty framework would entail major implications for 
the decision-making procedure under Title V TFEU expanding the ordinary legislative procedure to most 
fields of justice and home affairs, including to the field of legal immigration.
11 
To address the issues raised, the paper is structured in the following way: in a first step, the background, the 
rationale and the procedure that determined the adoption of the Blue Card Directive are explained (section 
2). In a next step, the paper analyses the Council negotiations of the latter Directive with a view to 
investigate, first, who qualifies as a ‘highly qualified’ third-country worker under the Blue Card Directive, 
and second, the level of rights offered to Blue Card holders, which is key for their inclusion in the host 
member state (section 3).  
The question of who is considered to be ‘highly qualified’ by the Blue Card Directive is central (section 3.1). 
It has been pointed out that the definition of ‘highly-skilled immigrant’ in national settings is unclear and at 
times not purely contingent on the educational and professional qualifications of the worker, but on other 
criteria such as the expected salary level.
12 In the latter case, this would imply that the notion of ‘highly 
                                                                                                                                                                                
differ on admission of highly qualified workers. Such workers are increasingly needed to fill existing and arising gaps 
on the labour market, but the EU substantially fails in attracting them.” (p. 5).  
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 2. 
11 In 2004, on the basis of a Council Decision, the Community method was extended to all fields of migration under 
former Title IV EC Treaty except for the field of legal migration – see Council Decision of 22 December 2004 
providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be 
governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty (2004/927/EC). 
12 S. Carrera (2007), “Building a Common Policy on Labour Immigration: Towards a Comprehensive and Global 
Approach in the EU”, CEPS Working Document No. 256, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, p. 2. ASSESSING THE ‘ATTRACTIVENESS’ OF THE EU’S BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE FOR ‘HIGHLY QUALIFIED’ IMMIGRANTS | 3 
 
skilled’ is strongly linked to the profit that the immigrant worker would generate in the state of destination.
13 
The analysis aims to illustrate that we experience a similar scenario under the EU Blue Card scheme. It is 
explored what exactly the Blue Card Directive offers to such ‘highly qualified’ immigrants (in terms of the 
level of rights and benefits) with a view to facilitating their inclusion (section 3.2). Such rights and benefits 
deal with, for example, the ease to access the labour market in a given member state, the possibility to bring 
one’s family along or to move within the EU for employment purposes.  
Treating certain third-country workers more favourably than others raises questions of non-discrimination: 
the fact that a sectoral approach in labour migration (“geared towards highly-skilled migrants”) would result 
in discrimination was already pointed out by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in 
2005.
14 The EU’s sectoral approach in labour migration has contributed to creating a highly fragmented legal 
framework for third-country nationals. Alongside issues of non-discrimination, this fragmented legal 
framework raises serious concerns relating to coherence, transparency and legal certainty (see section 4). 
The paper moreover gives an insight into how the Blue Card Directive has been implemented to date in a 
selection of the member states, including Germany, France, Spain, Hungary and Sweden. This comparison 
provides a clearer picture of how the Blue Card has been framed in the distinct national systems (section 5). 
The paper ends with some key findings and policy suggestions (section 6). 
The paper was drafted within the framework of the NEUJOBS research project, which aims to analyse future 
possible developments of the European labour market(s) under the main assumption that European societies 
face four main transitions that will have a major impact on employment.
15 The attractiveness of the Blue 
Card Directive, the flagship of the EU’s labour immigration policy, is important to investigate in particular in 
the light of the objective to increase international migration to the EU to mitigate shortages in European 
labour markets: most notably, migrants are the key actors in the societal transition and they play a 
fundamental role in the skills transition, in which education and skills matter, more than ever, for 
employment and wages.  
2.  Adopting the EU Blue Card Directive: Background, rationale and procedure 
On the basis of the competences under Title V TFEU on the area of freedom, security and justice, the EU has 
adopted a number of legislative instruments in the area of labour immigration since 1999. The 2001 
Commission proposal stipulating the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
employment purposes did not find the necessary support by the member states in the Council. This rejection 
was due to different reasons, such as the sensitivity surrounding the policy field of labour migration, the lack 
of consensus concerning a combined residence and work permit, as well as a highly bureaucratic framework 
suggested by the proposal, which did not mesh with the member states’ national systems.
16 Therefore, from 
2005 onwards, a sectoral approach was pursued covering specific categories of third-country nationals. One 
of these categories related to highly-skilled immigration.
17 In other words, the adoption of the Blue Card 
Directive must be seen as one of the measures of the sectoral approach in the area of EU legal economic 
migration that was pursued as a compromise solution after it became clear that a horizontal approach 
covering all third-country nationals was not backed by the member states.  
                                                      
13 Ibid. 
14 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing 
economic migration, CESE 694/2005 - SOC/199 (COM(2004) 811 final), Rapporteur: Mr. Pariza Castaños (Spain), 9 
June 2005; see also S. Carrera and M. Formisano (2005), “An EU Approach to Labour Migration – What is the Added 
Value and the Way Ahead?”, CEPS Working Document No. 232, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, p. 11. 
15 The NEUJOBS project is financed by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme; the four main 
transitions that will have a major impact on employment are socio-ecological and societal transitions, a skills transition 
and a transition concerning new territorial dynamics (see website of the NEUJOBS project at www.neujobs.eu. Work 
Package 18 deals with “Labour Immigration Policy and Socio-Economic Integration of Immigrants in Europe”. 
16 S. Carrera and M. Formisano (2005), “An EU Approach to Labour Migration – What is the Added Value and the Way 
Ahead?”, CEPS Working Document No. 232, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, pp. 2-3. 
17 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country-
nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed activities, COM(2001) 386, 11.7.2001; European 
Commission Communication, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669, 21.12.2005.   4 | KATHARINA EISELE 
 
When explaining that the proposed Blue Card Directive complied with the subsidiarity principle, the 
Commission also specified the underlying rationale of the Directive: 
If Member States act alone, they may not be able to face international competition for highly 
qualified third-country workers. There will be a series of different entry and residence conditions for 
these workers, each national system being closed and in competition with the others. This could lead 
to distortions in immigrants' choices, and more importantly would over-complicate the re-allocation 
of the necessary labour force as needs change on labour markets, with the possibility of losing a 
highly qualified workforce already present in the EU.
18  
It took the member states 19 months, and hence four different Presidencies, to come to an agreement on the 
final text of the Blue Card Directive in the Council. This time frame is rather short as compared to the 
lengthy negotiations on other migration law directives. The Blue Card Directive, which sets out the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment 
for longer than three months, was adopted by unanimity in the Council; the European Parliament was only 
consulted.
19 The Directive does not apply to Denmark, or to the UK or Ireland.
20  
The negotiations that have resulted in the Blue Card Directive started in January 2008. The documents that 
detail the negotiations include the Commission proposal of 23 October 2007,
21 the outcome of proceedings 
summarised by the Council Working Party on Migration and Expulsion as well as by the JHA Counsellors, 
and official correspondence between the General Secretariat, Coreper II, the Presidency, the Strategic 
Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), and the afore-mentioned Working Party. The 
Blue Card Directive was adopted on 25 May 2009.  
3.  The Council Negotiations on the EU Blue Card Directive: Shaping 
‘attractiveness’ 
This section illustrates how the ‘attractiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive as first conceptualised in the 
Commission proposal by DG HOME was reshaped during the law-making process under the Slovenian, 
French and Czech Presidencies. While the Commission aimed to promote the Europeanisation of migration 
policies under the sectoral approach, the member states were, by contrast, eager to stick to their national 
schemes for highly qualified immigrants.  
The Council negotiations on the key provisions contained in the Blue Card Directive dealing with the 
questions of ‘who’ the Directive targets (scope of application) and ‘what’ the Directive offers to Blue Card 
holders (level of rights that Blue Card holders enjoy) are analysed. The French Presidency pointed out that 
the most contentious issues during the Council negotiations on the Blue Card Directive in 2008 concerned 
the definitions, the admission criteria (in particular the salary requirement) and the complementarity between 
EU and national provisions.
22  
3.1  The Definition of ‘Highly Qualified’: A Blue Card Directive for whom?  
Article 3 of the Blue Card Directive determines that the measure applies to third-country nationals who apply 
to be admitted to the territory of a member state for the purpose of highly qualified employment under the 
terms of this Directive. The Council’s records concerning the definitions of “highly qualified employment” 
and “higher professional qualifications” and “higher education qualifications”, which are key in determining 
to whom the Blue Card Directive applies, are explored below.  
                                                      
18 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637, 23.10.2007, p. 7. 
19 European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2008 on the proposal for a Council Directive on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
20 See Recitals 28 and 29 of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
21 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637, 23.10.2007. 
22 See Council of the European Union, Note – Presidency, 15 September 2008, document number: 13029/08, p. 1. ASSESSING THE ‘ATTRACTIVENESS’ OF THE EU’S BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE FOR ‘HIGHLY QUALIFIED’ IMMIGRANTS | 5 
 
The discussions also related to the question as to which categories of third-country nationals should be 
excluded from the scope of the Directive, such as those who are covered by other EU directives.
23 
Importantly, a clause was inserted into Article 3 allowing the member states to issue (national) residence 
permits other than an EU Blue Card for any purpose of employment, which was supported by Germany and 
opposed by the European Commission.
24 This latter addition provides the member states with the option to 
maintain or introduce national admission schemes for highly-qualified employment.
25 
3.1.1 ‘Highly-Qualified  Employment’ 
The definition of ‘highly-qualified employment’ was extensively negotiated: what exactly should this 
expression mean for the purpose of the Directive? The Commission proposed the definition of employment 
established by the Court of Justice in the free movement law of EU citizens (“the exercise of genuine and 
effective work under the direction of someone else for which a person is paid”
26) adding the requirement of 
higher education qualifications or at least three years of equivalent professional experience.
27 The 
Commission explained that this definition was based on two elements: first, the requirement of being 
employed (excluding self-employed activities); second, the necessary ‘higher professional qualifications’ 
requirements, which should be replaceable by a minimum of three years professional experience in the 
profession, instead of the higher education qualifications.
28 In addition, the Commission underlined that the 
definition should be considered in the context of employment, insofar as it aims at defining the job and not 
the third-country nationals concerned.
29 
The member states had concerns about different aspects of the proposed wording. Hungary, for example, 
expressed doubts about the fact that the professional experience could be considered equivalent to higher 
educational qualifications. Likewise, Estonia and Latvia suggested that the focus of this definition should be 
on education, and Greece proposed deleting the addition or at least three years of equivalent professional 
experience altogether. Italy, Portugal and Slovakia expressed reservations about the number of years (at least 
three years) of equivalent professional experience required. Germany, Latvia and Austria indicated the risk 
of abuse in the assessment of the equivalent professional experience – Germany asked to insert for which 
either higher education qualifications or both equivalent qualifications at and least three years of 
professional experience is required, thereby narrowing down the option to substitute professional 
experience. Sweden suggested deleting the word equivalent and introducing two different profiles of highly 
skilled workers, the first relating to the third-country nationals who possess higher educational qualifications, 
and the second concerning those who have acquired the required professional experience.
30  
The final version of the Blue Card Directive defines ‘highly-qualified employment’ as the employment of a 
person who:  
-  in the member state concerned, is protected as an employee under national employment law and/or in 
accordance with national practice, irrespective of the legal relationship, for the purpose of exercising 
genuine and effective work for, or under the direction of, someone else,  
-  is paid, and,  
                                                      
23 See Article 3(2) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
24 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 
2008, document number: 9666/08, p. 7, footnote 14. 
25 Article 3(4) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
26 Case 66/85 Lawrie Blum [1986] ECR 2121 and Case C-456/02 Trojani [2002] ECR I-7573. 
27 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637, 23.10.2007, p. 19. 
28 European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637, 23.10.2007, p. 
9. 
29 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 
2008, document number: 5255/08, p. 4, footnote 4. 
30 Ibid., p. 4, footnote 6. 6 | KATHARINA EISELE 
 
-  has the required adequate and specific competence, as proven by higher professional qualifications.
31 
At the request of Sweden, the first subparagraph was amended inserting the requirement that a person falling 
under ‘highly qualified employment’ must be protected as an employee under national employment law.
32 
The wording of the third subparagraph was defined more precisely by the addition adequate and specific 
technical competence, as Portugal had suggested.
33 The specifications of relevant or equivalent to qualify 
‘professional qualifications’ were dropped (see, however, definition of ‘higher professional qualifications’ 
below); instead, the term was renamed ‘higher professional qualifications’.  
3.1.2  ‘Higher Professional Qualifications’ 
In the proposal of the Commission, ‘higher professional qualifications’ was defined as “qualifications 
attested by evidence of higher education qualifications or of at least three years of equivalent professional 
experience.”  
A considerable number of member states entered scrutiny reservations with regard to the required period of 
professional experience, but it was Poland that first requested a five years-period.
34 The Netherlands and 
Sweden did not support the increase in the number of years of professional experience from three to five 
years.
35 The Working Party on Migration and Expulsion did not support the idea of an aptitude test aimed at 
assessing the professional experience of the person concerned.
36 The Commission pointed out that the 
professional experience should be assessed by the member states, taking into account the standards and 
requirements set by the employer for the relevant job.
37  
Austria initially asked that both – higher education qualifications and professional experience – should be 
required, whereas Germany, reiterating the risk of abuse, proposed to delete the requirement of professional 
experience.
38 This suggestion by the German delegation was supported by other delegations which 
considered that the emphasis should be on educational qualifications.
39 The Presidency, held by Slovenia at 
the time, as well as Malta, drew attention to the fact that in some sectors which may be relevant for the 
purposes of this proposal, the persons concerned do not possess higher education qualifications.
40 Recalling 
the special needs, especially in the field of the information technology, the Commission highlighted the 
importance of maintaining, even if only as a subsidiary possibility, the criterion of the professional 
experience. The Presidency, held by France in the second half of 2008, also felt that it would be important 
not to exclude such a possibility, in order to make the proposal more attractive for highly qualified third-
country nationals.
41 
The final text upon which the Council agreed leaves the member states more leeway in that higher 
educational qualifications can – if provided for by national law – be substituted by five years of relevant 
                                                      
31 Article 2(b) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
32 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 
2008, document number: 9666/08, p. 3, footnote 4. 
33 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, 
document number: 8249/08, p. 3, footnote 7. 
34 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 
2008, document number: 5255/08, p. 6, footnote 11. 
35 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 
2008, document number: 9666/08, p. 4, footnote 6. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 
2008, document number: 5255/08, p. 6, footnote 11. 
38 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, 
document number: 8249/08, p. 5, footnotes 12-13; Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working 
Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, document number: 9666/08, p. 4, footnote 6. 
39 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, 
document number: 9666/08, p. 4, footnote 6. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 24 July 2008, 
document number: 11512/08, p. 4, footnote 3. ASSESSING THE ‘ATTRACTIVENESS’ OF THE EU’S BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE FOR ‘HIGHLY QUALIFIED’ IMMIGRANTS | 7 
 
professional experience of a level comparable to higher educational qualifications and which is relevant in 
the profession or sector specified in the work contract or binding job offer.
42 When compared to the original 
proposed definition, the adopted provision renders the Blue Card more exclusive, and thus more difficult to 
obtain. 
3.1.3  ‘Higher Education Qualifications’ 
Article 2(h) of the Blue Card Directive defines ‘higher education qualification’ as 
any diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal qualifications issued by a competent authority 
attesting the successful completion of a post-secondary higher education programme, namely a set of 
courses provided by an educational establishment recognised as a higher education institution by the 
State in which it is situated. For the purposes of this Directive, a higher education qualification shall 
be taken into account, on condition that the studies needed to acquire it lasted at least three years. 
This definition was subject to some minor amendments in the Council, but the requirement of a minimum of 
three years’ study was maintained.
43 The Commission made clear that the expression recognised as a higher 
education institution by the State in which it is situated aimed at covering all the post-secondary education, 
in accordance with the Bologna classification.
44 Along this line, the definition was adjusted. Next, the terms 
‘any degree, diploma or other certificate’ used in the proposal were changed into ‘any diploma, certificate or 
other evidence of formal qualifications’ for clarification purposes. The suggestion by Malta to include a 
reference to the European Qualifications Framework or the ISCED (International Standard Classification for 
Education) was not integrated.
45 
3.1.4  Admission Requirements  
Article 5 of the Blue Card Directive sets out the criteria for admission. Notably, there was much debate about 
the salary threshold that would be required for obtaining the Blue Card in Article 5(3). The Commission 
proposal reads in Article 5(2): 
[…] the gross monthly salary specified in the work contract or binding job offer must not be inferior 
to a national salary threshold defined and published for the purpose by the Member States which 
shall be at least three times the minimum gross monthly wage as set by national law.” The second 
paragraph of Article 5(2) continued: “Member States where minimum wages are not defined shall 
set the national salary threshold to be at least three times the minimum income under which citizens 
of the Member State concerned are entitled to social assistance in that Member State, or to be in line 
with applicable collective agreements or practices in the relevant occupation branches. 
Numerous member states put forward objections and suggestions for amendments regarding this provision.
46 
Hungary proposed that the member states should be able to determine the minimum gross monthly salary 
threshold themselves, which would provide the member states with more discretion.
47 Austria asked for an 
additional reference to integration conditions, which would make it more difficult to obtain a Blue Card.
48 
The Commission underlined the need for a salary-based approach: a relative salary threshold was considered 
to be the minimum criterion necessary for admission by the vast majority of member states and the member 
                                                      
42 See also Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to SCIFA, 7 July 2008, document number: 
11365/08, p. 2; Article 2(g) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC. 
43 See Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to SCIFA, 7 July 2008, document number: 11365/08, 
p. 2. 
44 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 
2008, document number: 5255/08, p. 6, footnote 10. 
45 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, 
document number: 8249/08, p. 5, footnote 11. 
46 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 February 
2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 7, footnote 10. 
47 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, 
document number: 8249/08, p. 13, footnote 31. 
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states remained free to set the national threshold at a higher level (but not at a lower one).
49 Germany 
suggested a monthly salary of at least twice the average gross monthly salary of the member state concerned; 
this suggestion was supported by Austria, which proposed, however, a coefficient of 1.35 of the average 
gross monthly salary.
50 The reference to the average gross monthly wage was adopted (instead of referring to 
a minimum wage) in the final text. It was agreed to set the coefficient in the middle at least 1.5 times the 
average gross monthly wage, pointing out that “an indicator of this type has the advantage of reflecting real 
pay levels in a given member state and of being available for all member states. It remains consistent with 
the objective of targeting highly qualified employment, since the level is, by definition, above the average, 
and is set sufficiently above that average.”
51 Some delegations considered the multiplier of 1.5 as too low or 
too high respectively.
52 Article 5(5) of the Directive provides, however, the derogation for employment in 
professions, which are in particular need of third-country workers, to require at least 1.2 times the average 
gross annual salary. Generally speaking, the wage is thus another decisive factor as to whether a third-
country worker may obtain an EU Blue Card and is considered to be ‘highly skilled’. 
Most of the other admission criteria in Article 5(1) points (a) to (f) of the adopted Blue Card Directive have 
been amended during the Council negotiations. The notion of a “binding job offer” in Article 5(1) points (a), 
(b) and (c) was specified by the amendment “as provided for by national law” because Poland and Greece 
emphasised that this notion was not acknowledged in their legal systems.
53 This amendment provides for 
more leeway for the member states. 
Article 5(1) point (b) was slightly changed in that proof must be attested to by a document for fulfilment of 
the conditions set out under national law for the exercise by Union citizens of the regulated profession 
specified in the work contract or binding job offer. Austria’s request to add at the end of point (b) the words 
“including the higher professional qualifications” was not considered.
54 This additional requirement would 
have rendered admission for applicants even stricter. 
Article 5(1) point (c) on unregulated professions raised some concern among a number of the member states. 
The Netherlands, supported by Sweden, considered the criterion of salary as sufficient and pointed out that it 
was unclear as to who would assess the qualifications. In addition, the two member states took the view that 
the authorities should not take the role of the employer. Poland felt that “a system providing for a double 
check of the qualifications could have the consequence of making the admission of the person concerned 
more complicated”.
55 Similarly, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece and Romania entered reservations on this provision, 
questioning which bodies would assess the equivalence [of professional qualifications] and on the basis of 
which criteria.
56 France came up with two possibilities: either envisaging a regular updating of the two 
criteria (higher qualifications and equivalent professional experience) or providing for a system which would 
combine them.
57 At a later stage of the negotiations Ireland and the Netherlands even suggested to delete this 
provision.
58 Except for the proposal of France, the considerations all go into one direction: they aim at not 
making admission too restrictive for the applicants in cases where professions are unregulated, taking thus a 
                                                      
49 Ibid., p. 13, footnote 31. 
50 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 
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52 Ibid. 
53 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 February 
2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 4, footnote 4. 
54 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, 
document number: 8249/08, p. 10, footnote 24. 
55 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 February 
2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 5, footnote 5. 
56 Ibid.; Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 18 
January 2008, document number: 5255/08, p. 4, footnote 6. 
57 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 February 
2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 5, footnote 5.  
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favourable stance for applicants. In the end, however, the final provision was only amended by the addition: 
“binding job offer as provided for by national law”. 
Article 5(1) point (d) was adjusted on the initiative of Belgium, Greece and Hungary, which stated that an 
application could also be submitted if the applicant resided outside the member state where he/she should be 
admitted to work – this could be addressed with a reference to visas. Therefore, an ‘applicant-friendly’ 
solution was inserted referring to a visa or even the application for a visa, if required.
59 Next, the scope of 
evidence of a valid residence permit was extended in the final version of the Directive by including the 
addition: “or of a national long-term visa, if appropriate”. 
Article 5(1) point (e) has the objective to avoid possible double insurance. The provision was eventually 
worded somewhat more favourably than initially suggested by the Commission at the request by the 
Netherlands, requiring “[…] evidence of having or, if provided for by national law, having applied for 
sickness insurance […]”.
60 Admittedly, this leaves some room for manoeuvre in cases where the member 
states’ laws foresee this exception. Germany’s demand to also require “appropriate means of subsistence” 
was not incorporated. The reference to the sickness insurance cover of the family members of a Blue Card 
holder was deleted in this provision; such family members are still required to have sickness insurance, as set 
out by the Family Reunification Directive.
61 
Only Article 5(1) point (f) was not changed, despite suggestions made by the Netherlands and supported by 
Germany to add “as defined by national law”. The Commission rejected this suggestion pointing to the fact 
that the same clause was used in the Directives on students and researchers.
62 The member states would have 
obtained discretion to determine the terms “public policy, public security and public health” in this context 
themselves, had this suggested amendment been accepted. 
Article 5(2) of the Blue Card Directive allows member states to require the applicant to provide his address 
in the territory of the member state concerned. This addition was a compromise suggested by the 
Commission in response to the request of Slovakia, supported by Hungary and Austria, to include the 
requirement of providing evidence of appropriate accommodation (as in the case of the sponsor under Article 
7(a) of the Directive on the right to family reunification). The Commission took the view that it would not be 
justified to introduce this new requirement, as the situation is quite different (the sponsor already lives in the 
territory of the member state concerned, while under this proposal the applicant will, in most cases, not be 
resident there yet).
 63 
3.2  The Level of Rights offered to Blue Card Holders  
The first contribution of Work Package 18 of the NEUJOBS project focused on the trends and gaps in the 
academic literature on EU labour migration. In examining the literature on highly skilled immigration, M. De 
Somer observes that “the rights/benefits that are most often singled out by studies concern the right to family 
reunification (and rights granted to family members upon arrival), followed by employment and social 
security rights, and finally the possibility to acquire permanent residence”.
64 She queried why many 
academic studies of such rights mirror a logic of international competition “in reviewing the relative 
attraction-value that can be accorded to each of these rights”. As a consequence, “rather than critically 
assessing the merit of granting such rights “an sich” [in itself], too often the review focuses on how the 
                                                      
59 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 February 
2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 5, footnote 7. 
60 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 February 
2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 6, footnote 8. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 6, footnote 9. 
63 See Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 28 
February 2008, document number: 6051/08, p. 4, footnote 3. 
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availability of any of these rights can positively influence the decisions of highly skilled persons to emigrate 
to the state at hand”.
65 
Importantly, the level of rights offered to immigrants is central for their inclusion and integration into the 
host member state because this level determines the degree to which they can take part in the labour market 
and society. The focus here, however, is on the Blue Card Directive exclusively. 
It has been pointed out that the isolated debates on highly skilled immigrant workers are problematic in that 
this isolation, first, obscures the framing of policy dilemmas through official narratives (such as the alleged 
need to participate in “the global race for talent”) and, second, prevents the development of a progressive 
accumulation of knowledge and stocktaking of the status of migrants’ rights in policy agendas and law-
making with regard to EU labour migration legislation as a whole.
66 In this context, the present research 
responds to the call for further research on the manner in which EU policies have constructed and justified 
the more generous framework for highly qualified immigrants, and separated this framework from the 
policies in place for lower-skilled migrants.
67  
This section provides an analysis on the Council negotiations of the level of rights that the Blue Card holders 
have been granted. The emphasis is on Article 12 on labour market access, Article 14 on equal treatment, 
Article 15 on family members, Article 16 on long-term resident status and Article 18 on intra-EU mobility. 
3.2.1  The Rules on Labour Market Access and Changes in Employer 
Article 12 of the Blue Card Directive deals with labour market access. This article has likewise been subject 
to lengthy negotiations in the Council working groups, but the provision was in the end not changed in a 
substantial way. The Commission emphasised that Article 12 of the Blue Card Directive aimed at setting out 
an attractive scheme for highly skilled workers. The Commission clarified that the objective of this provision 
is to allow either a change of functions or a change of enterprise, but in the framework of the same kind of 
job. The Commission pointed out that paragraph 2 of the provision set out two requirements for the person 
concerned: he/she must continue to exercise a highly qualified employment and he/she must notify any 
relevant changes to the competent authorities of the member states.
68 
While Spain asked for more flexibility by suggesting a one-year deadline in paragraphs 1 and 2, Malta on the 
contrary proposed a three-year time period for both provisions.
69 Italy took the view that not allowing the 
person concerned to change the job for a period of two years would infringe the principle of free choice of 
employment.
70 As regards modifications of the terms of the work contract that affect the conditions for 
admission or changes in the work relationship, the Netherlands, supported by France, felt that it should not 
be necessary to require a prior authorisation, as long as the person concerned continued to fulfil the 
conditions set out by the proposal. Likewise, Finland felt that the system for changing the job should be 
made more flexible.
71 
The Netherlands and Austria insisted on the possibility for member states to be able to verify that the person 
concerned continued to fulfil the salary criterion also beyond the first two years.
72 At the request of 
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Germany, supported by Austria, the word “residence” was replaced with “employment” both in paragraphs 1 
and 2, thus narrowing the rule on access to the labour market.
73 
3.2.2  Equality of Treatment with the Member States’ Nationals  
Article 14 of the Blue Card Directive specifies the equal treatment that Blue Card holders enjoy with 
nationals of the member state issuing the Blue Card. When comparing the originally proposed provision with 
the adopted article in the Blue Card Directive, it is striking that the equal treatment for Blue Card holders 
was restricted. Most visibly, the provisions providing for equal treatment as regards tax benefits and social 
assistance have been dropped at the initiative of Germany, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
74 
According to Spain, Article 14(b) of the Blue Card Directive on the freedom of association should contain a 
right to strike; this position was opposed by Austria.
75 Article 14(c) of the Blue Card Directive on education 
and vocational training was controversially discussed: several delegations pointed out that the notion of study 
grants was not clear. Germany suggested restricting the rights under point (c), as member states should be 
allowed to limit access to education, vocational training and study grants in accordance with national law.
76 
Paragraph 2 of Article 14 allows for further restrictions, and it was even tightened in the course of the 
negotiations: Germany proposed to also restrict access to education and vocational training. While this 
suggestion was not taken over, the proposals for a more restrictive approach of Austria (that access to 
university may be subject to specific prerequisites according to national law) and Sweden (the member state 
concerned may restrict equal treatment to cases where the registered or usual place of business of the Blue 
Card holder, or that of family members for whom benefits are claimed, lies within its territory) were 
integrated in the Blue Card Directive.
77 
Furthermore, Article 14(e) on social security of the Blue Card Directive was fiercely disputed. The Czech 
Republic demanded the deletion of the latter provision insofar as it interfered with the principle of 
subsidiarity, while Germany and Finland suggested listing all the benefits to which the Blue Card holders 
may be eligible rather than making reference to Regulation 1408/71. There was also disagreement about 
Article 14(f) on pensions of the Blue Card Directive. Again, the Czech Republic, this time with the support 
of Hungary and Austria, expressed its wish to delete this provision. However, the suggestion by Spain, along 
with Finland and Sweden, was eventually implemented, which asked for the consideration of income-based 
acquired pensions.
78 In relation to Article 14(e) on access to and supply of goods and services of the Blue 
Card Directive, it is interesting to point out that Germany, Finland and Austria were keen to limit the 
assistance to be provided by employment offices to information and counselling services.
79 
3.2.3 Favourable  Family Reunification Rights  
Article 15 on family members of the Blue Card Directive sets out the rules for family reunification. The 
provision stipulates derogations as regards the application of Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to 
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family reunification that are more favourable for Blue Card holders and their family members.
80 This means 
that: 
-  Family reunification will not be made dependent on the requirement of the EU Blue Card holder having 
reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence and having a minimum period of 
residence. 
-  Integration conditions and measures referred to in Council Directive 2003/86/EC may only be applied 
after the persons concerned have been granted family reunification. 
-  Residence permits for family members of EU Blue Card holders shall be granted, where the conditions 
for family reunification are fulfilled, at the latest within six months from the date on which the 
application was lodged. 
-  The duration of validity of the residence permits of family members shall be the same as that of the 
residence permits issued to the EU Blue Card holder insofar as the period of validity of their travel 
documents allows it. 
-  Member states will not apply any time limit in respect of access to the labour market for family members 
of EU Blue Card holders. 
-  For the purposes of calculating the five years of residence required for the acquisition of an autonomous 
residence permit, residence in different member states may be cumulated. 
-  If member states have recourse to the option provided for in the previous paragraph, the provisions set 
out in Article 16 of the Blue Card Directive on long-term resident status in respect of accumulation of 
periods of residence in different member states by the EU Blue Card holder shall apply mutatis 
mutandis.
81 
Article 15 was only slightly amended in the course of the Council negotiations, although some member states 
expressed reservations. Doubts related inter alia to the deadline of six months for issuance of residence 
permits for family members: Germany, supported by Sweden, preferred not to set any deadline at all and to 
simply state that the residence permits of the family members should be issued as soon as possible.
82 In reply 
to the remarks from the delegations, the Commission noted that the choice of setting a short deadline from 
the lodging of the application to the residence permit being issued for family members is a political one, 
based on the intention to attract highly skilled third-country nationals.
83 
When compared to the legal regime under Council Directive 2003/86/EC, the Blue Card Directive provides 
for a more advantageous set of rights for family reunification. Importantly, the Directive guarantees the 
family members of Blue Card holders access to the labour market without any time limit as requested by the 
Netherlands and supported by the Commission, which underlined that full labour market access from the first 
day of the stay, would render the provision certainly more attractive.
84  
However, the ‘may-clauses’ of this provision challenge the objective of granting Blue Card holders the same 
level of rights throughout the EU as envisaged by the proposal of the Commission: this holds true for the 
optional clause on integration measures (which became integration conditions and measures in the adopted 
text) as well as the optional clause on the accumulation of residence periods in different member states. As 
regards this last aspect, the Commission recalled that the purpose of this optional provision is not to penalise 
family members of EU Blue Card holders who exercise mobility in respect of the time needed to obtain an 
autonomous residence permit (and not the long-term resident permit, for which no facilitation is foreseen).
85 
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3.2.4  Advantageous Rules for Long-Term Resident Status 
Article 16 of the Blue Card Directive determines a derogatory regime for EU Blue Card holders under 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term resident status.
86 Considering the reservations and comments 
the member states had concerning this provision, it is quite surprising that the text as proposed by the 
Commission has only been subject to amendments related to the periods to obtain and keep the long-term 
resident status as a Blue Card holder. 
Several delegations emphasised that the implementation of this provision, which introduced a series of 
derogations to Council Directive 2003/109/EC, could give rise to quite a complex system, difficult to be 
managed by the national administrations, in particular with respect to the issue of absences. The Czech 
Republic felt that introducing such exceptions did not contribute to the clarity and simplicity of the system in 
general and took the view that once they fulfil the conditions of Directive 2003/109/EC, Blue Card holders 
should enjoy the same treatment as long-term residents, also with respect to absences. The Czech Republic 
suggested either entirely deleting the provision, as Austria, or maintaining the first two paragraphs only. 
According to Hungary, rather than targeting Blue Card holders who have acquired long-term resident status, 
the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 should apply to all long-term residents, having regard to the objective of 
fostering circular migration and also on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination.
87 
As suggested by the Commission, a Blue Card holder who made use of the intra EU-mobility right under the 
Directive (as developed below) is allowed to accumulate periods of residence in different member states in 
order to fulfil the requirement concerning the duration of residence, if he/she:  
-  has legally and continuously resided for five years in the EU as an EU Blue Card holder and  
-  had legal and continuous residence for two years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant 
application as an EU Blue Card holder within the territory of the member state where the application for 
the long-term resident’s residence permit was lodged.
88 
The suggestion of the German delegation to require six instead of five years of legal residence, and to 
increase the two-year to a three-year period, was not followed.
89 Article 16(3) of the Blue Card Directive sets 
out that, for the purpose of calculating the period of legal and continuous residence in the EU (by way of 
derogation Article 4(3) of Directive 2003/109/EC), periods of absence from the territory of the EU shall not 
interrupt the five-year period if they are shorter than 12 consecutive months and do not exceed in total 18 
months (not 16 months, as proposed by the Commission) within these five years; this paragraph shall apply 
also in cases where the EU Blue Card holder has not made use of the possibility to move to another member 
state under the Directive. Again, Germany opposed these derogations.
90 
Once long-term resident status has been obtained by the EU Blue Card holder, the person concerned enjoys 
the extended authorised period of absence from the territory of the EU of 24 consecutive months.
91 Spain and 
Belgium asked for the deletion of this paragraph. The Commission noted that Article 9(2) of the Long-Term 
Residents’ Directive is an optional provision, while this paragraph was a compulsory one and for this reason 
it preferred maintaining it.
92 
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Article 16(5) of the Blue Card Directive states that the derogations to Directive 2003/109/EC set out in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of this provision may be restricted (as opposed to shall as envisaged in the Commission 
proposal) to cases where the third-country national concerned can present evidence that he has been absent 
from the territory of the EU to exercise an economic activity in an employed or self-employed capacity, or to 
perform a voluntary service, or to study in his own country of origin. 
3.2.5 Promoting  Intra-EU  Mobility 
Article 18 of the Blue Card Directive addresses the conditions for residence of Blue Card holders in other 
member states. The Commission proposal explained that this provision 
aims to encourage the geographic mobility of highly qualified workers. Derogations to Directive 
2003/109/EC thus aim at not penalising mobile workers, by allowing them to cumulate periods of 
residence in two (or at the maximum three) member states in order to fulfil the main condition for 
obtaining the long-term resident status. The derogations on the periods of absence from the EU 
should be subject to strict conditions in order to sustain the circular migration policy and to limit 
possible brain drain effects.
93 
Belgium and Hungary questioned the added value of this provision.
94 A number of member states 
communicated their discontent concerning the time period of two years of legal residence after which the 
Blue Card holder would be entitled to move to a second member state. Sweden and Spain proposed to 
replace the two-year period with one year.
95 Equally, the Netherlands did not support the requirement of a 
period of two years and pointed out that the objective of this provision was to promote internal mobility.
96 
Finally, the member states agreed on an 18-month period.  
The Netherlands requested to insert, at the end of paragraph 2, that the applicant is not allowed to work 
during the application procedure.
97 This limiting addition was incorporated in a more attenuated form 
providing member states with the option to prohibit the applicant from working until a positive decision was 
declared on the application. 
The particular importance of this provision is reflected in the preamble to the adopted Blue Card Directive: 
the occupational and geographical mobility of third-country highly qualified workers should be 
recognised as a primary mechanism for improving labour market efficiency, preventing skill 
shortages and offsetting regional imbalances.
98 
4.  The Council Negotiations Reviewed: The Implications of Reshaping 
‘Attractiveness’ 
The above analysis of the Council records concerning the scope of application of the Blue Card Directive 
and the level of rights for Blue Card holders reveals a number of key issues that had a direct impact on the 
shaping of ‘attractiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive. 
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4.1  Tug-of-War in Law-Making: Jeopardising Coherence 
The genesis of the Blue Card Directive represents a paramount example of the continuous power struggle 
between the EU institutions. The Commission used the latter Directive as a justification for ‘more Europe’ in 
the field of legal migration, which is an area of mixed competence after it became clear that a horizontal 
approach was blocked by the member states. With its proposal, the Commission aimed at a high level of 
harmonisation envisaging using the EU competence to the fullest extent. The member states, in turn, had a 
keen interest in maintaining sovereignty concerning the admission schemes for highly skilled migrants. It 
turned out to be impossible to push through the Blue Card Directive without preserving the member states’ 
respective national systems for highly qualified third-country immigrants. Seeing that the measure was 
subject to unanimity voting in the Council, the latter institution and each of the member states held a strong 
position. The role of the European Parliament was very much limited in that it merely issued a non-binding 
opinion. Arguably, however, this opinion was taken into consideration to a certain extent which can inter alia 
be attributed to the pre-Lisbon context of the proposal. A migrant-centred approach is not apparent in the 
Blue Card Directive: it seems as if the interests of individuals have been sacrificed to allow the interests of 
the institutional actors to prevail. 
Coherence has considerably been jeopardised on various levels. First, the sectoral approach in EU labour 
migration policy led to a highly dispersed and non-transparent legal framework going against the principle of 
legal certainty. Second, the insertion of Article 3(4) into the Blue Card Directive has endangered the 
coherence of the Blue Card scheme itself, seeing that this provision permits the member states to issue 
national residence permits next to the Blue Card for any purpose of employment, including for highly-
qualified employment. This option calls into question the Commission’s objective to overcome “different 
entry and residence conditions for these workers, each national system being closed and in competition with 
the others” assuming the Blue Card Directive would create a common level playing field by introducing one 
European highly skilled admission scheme.
99 In this context, it must be pointed out that Article 6 of the 
Directive in fact already closes each national system in that it allows member states to stipulate quotas for 
third-country nationals entering their respective territory for the purposes of highly qualified employment.
100 
The EU Blue Card can thus be regarded as an upgraded national residence and work permit. 
Moreover, the Council records reveal to what extent the Commission’s understanding of ‘attractiveness’ of 
the Blue Card Directive has been reshaped by the member states. One of the most contentious issues related 
to the scope of application of the Blue Card Directive. From the start, some member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe queried why the focus was put on highly skilled workers from third countries, leaving 
potential within the EU unused. This position is understandable as it relates to the fundamental issue whether 
third-country nationals can (even temporarily) be treated more favourably than certain EU citizens by virtue 
of transitional arrangements that restrict the latter’s free movement rights.  
It has been pointed out that the suggested wording by the Commission of “highly qualified employment”, 
which is at the heart of the Blue Card Directive determining who is eligible for the Blue Card, provided for 
valuable flexibility to meet business needs.
101 This flexibility has to a certain extent been compromised as the 
adopted text allows for the substitution of higher education qualifications, if provided for by national law, by 
five years of specified, relevant professional experience. Some member states emphasised the alleged risk of 
abuse in the assessment of the equivalent professional experience, while others underscored that in some 
sectors that may be relevant for the purposes of this proposal, the persons concerned do not possess higher-
education qualifications.  
The Blue Card applicant must further comply with the salary requirement, which was subject to much 
discussion. In its opinion on the Blue Card Directive, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
took a clear position, stating that salary is not an appropriate criterion for consideration as a highly qualified 
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worker.
102 Rather, the EESC specified, the “concept of ‘highly qualified’ should be linked to higher 
education certificates and qualifications or equivalent vocational skills rather than the salary that the worker 
is to receive”. The EESC warned that “making salary one of the requirements for access to the EU Blue Card 
will make it hard to achieve a common policy in the EU” and that “the major differences in national 
minimum wage levels that currently exist between the member states hinder harmonisation”. By contrast, the 
European Parliament implicitly accepted salary as a criterion for highly qualified employment by suggesting 
a national level of at least 1.7 times the gross average wage in the member state concerned.
103 In the end, the 
threshold was set at least 1.5 times the average gross monthly wage. The compromise was based on the 
argument that this definition reflected the real pay levels in the member states and could be used in all 
member states. The salary level is hence also a determining factor as to whether a third-country worker may 
be considered as ‘highly qualified’ for the purpose of the Blue Card Directive. Taking into account, however, 
that the average gross monthly wage differs in the member states (ranging from €61,640 in Sweden to 
€13,372 in Hungary, see section 5), the Directive does not give a conclusive answer as to who those ‘highly 
qualified’ immigrants are – it may differ from member state to member state. This differentiation in terms of 
salary requirement is actually reflected in the member states’ pre-existing national systems for ‘highly 
qualified’ immigrants.
104 The warning that the predominance of national trends in EU labour migration 
policy undermines coherency was already given in 2007.
105 In addition, the way of calculating the average 
wage may vary across the member states, thereby making a direct comparison difficult. 
The discussions on the scope of application and the salary requirement are illustrative for the negotiations of 
other provisions: the Commission repeatedly stressed the factor of ‘attractiveness’ to underline and justify its 
position; however, in many instances it proved difficult to convince the member states, which held a strong 
position to amend the various provisions of the Blue Card Directive. These amendments compromised the 
‘attractiveness’ as initially framed by the Commission. The frequent use of ‘may-clauses’ provided the 
member states with wide discretion and rendered the implementation of Blue Card Directive less coherent 
throughout the national legal systems. The same challenge poses the often-inserted addition “as provided for 
by national law” that allows the member states to condition rules and rights in line with their own systems.  
4.2  Privileging as a Form of Discrimination  
The EU Blue Card, once acquired, provides for an upgraded permit in comparison to what other EU 
Directives offer in the field of legal migration; the basis for this differentiation is based on the sectoral 
approach pursued in EU policy on labour migration. The EU Blue Card Directive sets forth special, 
privileged rules in relation to labour market access, equality of treatment with member states’ nationals, 
family reunification as well as more favourable rights concerning long-term resident status. Concerning this 
latter aspect, importantly, the EU Blue Card holder may be absent from the territory of the EU for a period of 
up to 24 consecutive months. 
A derogatory rule for young professionals who are less likely to have enough professional experience to 
claim high salaries (former Article 6 of the Commission proposal) was deleted. Some member states opined 
that the provision conflicted with the principle of non-discrimination.
106 The most surprising outcome relates 
to Article 18 of the Blue Card Directive on intra-EU mobility, which was considered to be one of the key 
elements for making the Blue Card Directive ‘attractive’. The envisaged time period of two years of legal 
residence after which the Blue Card holder would be entitled to move to a second member state was reduced 
to an 18-month period. This adjustment constitutes a real advantage as it allows for faster reactions to labour 
                                                      
102 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions 
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106 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 
2008, document number: 9666/08, p. 11, footnote 27. ASSESSING THE ‘ATTRACTIVENESS’ OF THE EU’S BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE FOR ‘HIGHLY QUALIFIED’ IMMIGRANTS | 17 
 
market developments in the member states. However, the Blue Card holder and/or his employer must 
present, along with the application for the Blue Card in the second member state, all the documents proving 
the fulfilment of the admission conditions of Article 5 for the second member state. 
In more general terms, the ‘attractiveness’ conceptualised in the Blue Card Directive translates into an 
enhanced set of rights for those workers who qualify as ‘highly qualified’ immigrants for the purpose of the 
Directive. This raises questions as regards the general principle of non-discrimination: S. Carrera criticised 
this approach as utilitarian, selective and profit-oriented, in that the economic interests of the state dictate 
“special employment schemes with a facilitated administrative system for entry and residence only for the 
kind of labour force categorised as ‘highly skilled’, ‘profitable’ or ‘talented’.”
107 E. Guild considered the 
categorisation of migrants based on their perceived value to the EU labour markets as a “market approach to 
human beings”: third-country nationals who are highly qualified workers are given better rights than workers 
who are lower skilled.
108 It has been stated that “the paradoxical outcome of these mechanisms is that the 
economically stronger are privileged, while the economically weaker enjoy fewer rights”.
109 This is the 
system underlying the sectoral approach; the negotiations on the directives on intra-corporate transferees and 
seasonal workers are ongoing.
110 
The final version of the Blue Card Directive is a compromise that raises serious doubts as to the added value 
of the measure. It is true that the Blue Card Directive establishes, for the first time, a system that allows for 
intra-EU mobility to respond rather promptly to fluctuating demands for highly qualified migrant labour. 
Yet, whether this possibility of intra-EU mobility is actually perceived as ‘attractive’ by the migrants 
targeted – and used – remains to be seen. In any event, taking into consideration the option for member states 
to apply national highly skilled systems in parallel and the wide discretion that many provisions of the Blue 
Card Directive leave to the member states challenge the initial idea of creating “common rules for 
admission” for highly skilled migrants who should enjoy “the same level of rights throughout the EU” as 
envisaged by the Commission.
111 We have now in place a multi-layer, complex system, as the Blue Card 
Directive exists alongside the (possibly up to 28) national systems for highly qualified employment.  
5.  The Implementation of the Blue Card Directive – A First Perspective on Five 
Member States 
It is crucial to explore how the Blue Card Directive has been implemented into national law four years after 
its adoption considering the wide scope of discretion that the member states enjoy in view of the 
transposition. This section provides a first perspective on the implementation in Germany, France, Spain, 
Hungary and Sweden.
112 The information provided below was obtained on the basis of interviews with 
policy-makers as well as relevant literature; the Commission evaluation on the application of the Blue Card 
Directive in the member states is ongoing at this point in time. 
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5.1 Germany 
In Germany the Blue Card Directive was transposed into national law with an implementing law of 1 June 
2012, which entered into force on 1 August 2012.
113 This implementing law contains six articles that provide 
for amendments of the Residence Act, the Nationality Act, the social security code, as well as a number of 
other acts. A foreign national qualifies for the EU Blue Card without a review of the German Federal 
Employment Agency provided that the conclusion of a work contract is in sight that allows him/her to earn a 
minimum annual salary of €46,400 (2012: €44,800), and provided that he/she is in possession of a national 
university diploma, or a foreign one that is comparable to a national university diploma.
114 Changes in 
employer are subject to prior authorisation in the first two years of legal employment.
115 
For employment in professions, which are in particular in need of third-country workers, the annual salary 
threshold has been set at €36,200 (2012: €34,944).
116 In such cases an examination by the Employment 
Agency is necessary to verify whether the respective working conditions and the salary correspond to the 
usual working conditions. Holders of a (fixed-term) EU Blue Card may in principle obtain a settlement 
permit after 33 months of legal employment.
117 He/she can qualify for such a settlement permit already after 
21 months of legal employment in case the Blue card holder has German language skills of a B1-level.
118 In 
addition, a new visa was introduced for foreign professionals holding a university degree (either a German 
degree, or a recognised one, or a foreign one that is comparable to a German degree) to look for employment 
for up to six months in Germany provided they dispose of sufficient funds to sustain themselves.
119 
There have also been amendments that facilitate access by foreign students enrolled at German universities 
to the labour market and improve their employment opportunities during their studies: foreign nationals who 
graduated from a German university and who earn less than the salary threshold necessary to obtain the Blue 
Card receive a residence permit for an employment that corresponds to their qualification in accordance with 
Article 18 of the German Residence Act. The salary must be sufficient to assure an independent livelihood; a 
review of the working conditions by the Federal Employment Agency has been dropped.
120 Graduates are 
eligible for a residence permit for up to 18 months to search for suitable employment, and they may work 
during this time period without restrictions.
121 Moreover, students may now work up to 120 days not 
requiring prior permission.
122 Likewise, foreign nationals who have a residence permit in line with Articles 
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16(5) or 17(1) of the German Residence Act for the purpose of completing vocational training can rely on 
improved rules allowing for access to the German labour market.
123 
The implementation of the Blue Card Directive into German law was received with approval and criticism 
by a committee of experts. The points that were criticised related in particular to the minimum salary 
threshold (because of the perceived risk of wage dumping), a bureaucratic and non-transparent German 
aliens law, the fixed-term right of residence, and the lack of a welcoming culture in Germany.
124 The German 
Minister of the Interior stressed that the Blue Card has been a success since its introduction: in mid-February 
2013, he stated that over 4,100 Blue Cards had been issued to highly qualified workers addressing the 
shortage of skilled labour in Germany.
125 
5.2 France 
The Blue Card Directive was transposed into the French legal system by virtue of the Law on Immigration, 
Integration and Nationality of 16 June 2011, as well as a decree of 6 September 2011.
126 In addition to 
excluding EEA and Swiss nationals, the Blue Card in France also excludes Algerian nationals from its scope 
of application on the basis of an agreement between France and Algeria of 27 December 1968. 
To obtain the Blue Card in France, the third-country migrant must have: 
-  a higher education qualification of at least three years issued by a university recognised in the state in 
which the institution is situated, or have five years of work experience of a comparable level;  
-  a work contract for the duration of minimum a year approved by the “Service de Main d’Œuvre 
Etrangère”; and 
-  a monthly salary that equals 1.5 times the average salary of reference, which is stipulated annually by the 
Minister in charge of immigration by decree; the salary threshold amounted to €52,725 gross per annum 
on 30 November 2011.
127 
The required monthly salary in France for the Blue Card happened to equal approximately three times the 
minimum salary (SMIC = salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance) – the definition initially 
proposed by the Commission. The French authorities did not make use of the derogation to require at least 
1.2 times the average gross annual salary for certain, particularly wanted professions as the salary threshold 
was too high for intermediate categories, such as health personnel with the exception of doctors. Instead, 
France has bilaterally decided on favourable recruitment rules with certain countries, such as with Tunisia 
and Senegal.
128  
The impact of the Blue Card in France has been limited to date, which has been attributed to the crisis that 
has hit the French economy hard. However, the Blue Card has been assessed as having a strong symbolic 
character. The policy discourse focusing on the need to attract talents created a consensus among politicians 
and civil society on the subject matter. A bill that aims to attract young foreign professionals below the age 
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of 30 is envisaged to be tabled in 2013 (the corresponding provision in the Blue Card Directive was deleted 
due to a lack of support from the other member states).
129 
5.3 Spain 
The 2009 reform of the Organic Law of Aliens (OLA) in Spain aimed at integrating certain EU immigration 
directives into Spanish law, including the Blue Card and Researchers’ Directives.
130 Prior to this reform, no 
specific approach towards highly skilled workers existed under the Spanish Immigration Act.
131 
In 2011, with a view to boosting the economy, a Royal Decree was adopted that provides for a flexible 
mechanism to specifically attract more skilled workers.
132 This Royal Decree on the Organic Law of Aliens 
(REOLA) introduced the provision on ‘highly-qualified workers’ under Article 38 ter of OLA implementing 
the Blue Card Directive. The new admission procedures stipulated in Articles 85 to 96 REOLA follow 
closely the system of the Directive.
133 Article 88.5 REOLA establishes the procedural rule for fast-track 
admission, stipulating a maximum of 45 days to resolve proceedings. Doubts have been raised in relation to 
the right of equal treatment as set out in Article 12 of the Blue Card Directive, pointing out that this rule does 
not appear in the implementing law.
134  
It has been emphasised that the definition of a highly qualified worker under Article 85 REOLA departs from 
the definition in the Directive: a highly qualified worker under this provision is a foreigner authorised to 
exercise an activity for which higher education qualifications are required; exceptionally, five years of 
professional experience can be considered (which is, however, not further explained in REOLA).
135 Contrary 
to the formulation in the Blue Card Directive, the definition of “higher education qualifications” is more 
restrictive: Article 85 REOLA refers to qualifications derived from higher studies of at least three years and 
that “provide a level of qualification necessary in order to exercise a profession which requires a higher level 
of capability or in order to be accepted on a programme of advanced research”. S. Iglesias Sánchez pointed 
out that this differentiation can only be understood by considering Recital 9 of the Directive, which refers to 
ISCED level 5a (higher education studies of at least three years) and 6 (advanced research qualifications, e.g. 
Master, PhD) and criticised the associated legal uncertainty it triggers.
136 
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A Blue Card applicant who wishes to enter Spain must produce evidence of an annual salary of at least 
€34,185 (1.5 times the average salary of reference: 22,790 in 2010).
137 In addition, a Blue Card applicant in 
Spain must:  
-  not be in an irregular situation;  
-  not have a criminal record for the last five years for crimes regulated Spanish legal order, 
-  not have been listed as non-admissible in databases such as the Schengen Information System and 
-  have paid the administrative fee.
138 
REOLA also introduced rules that facilitate the intra-EU mobility of workers as provided for under Title V 
of the Blue Card Directive; all EU Blue Card workers admitted as such in another EU member state will 
have the right to move to Spain for that activity with authorisation to reside and work without a visa.
139 
The Blue Directive was implemented in Spain in a time period of economic recession and high 
unemployment, which is reflected in the national legislation: the attraction of highly qualified workers was 
not a priority on the political agenda. The transposition into Spanish legislation is restrictive in some specific 
aspects.
140 
5.4 Hungary 
The Blue Card Directive was implemented into Hungarian law in June 2011.
141 In 2012, however, it was 
noted that the executive rules delegated to the government and responsible minister had not been issued.
142 In 
general, research indicates that the impact of the transposition of labour immigration law in Hungary remains 
limited because of the restrictiveness of the public sector for non-nationals, the insecurity of residence of 
third-country nationals and the inadequacy of the integration measures.
143  
The legal status of qualified workers in Hungary is determined by inter alia the following rules: the 
government may regulate the annual quota of employed third-country nationals including the Blue Card 
holders. Moreover, the applicant for the Blue Card must provide a written commitment of employment 
issued by the potential employer that establishes the authorisation. “This commitment shall contain the name 
of position, the length of employment, the minimum monthly salary of the worker and the required 
qualification. These conditions must not be changed because the labour contract becomes void if its 
substance is different from the written commitment. The executive rules will define how to account for the 
size of salary (over the lawful minimum).”
144 In Hungary a Blue Card applicant must dispose of a salary of at 
least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary, which amounted to 4,014,000  Hungarian Forint [about 
€13,372] in 2012.
145  
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5.5 Sweden 
Sweden transposed the Blue Card Directive in 2013 after the Swedish government had received a letter of 
formal notice and a letter of reasoned opinion from the Commission. On 13 June 2013, the Swedish 
parliament adopted the respective government bill, which was published on 2 July 2013.
146 The legislation 
implementing the Blue Card Directive entered into force on 1 August 2013. The Blue Card Directive mainly 
entails amendments in the Swedish Aliens Act
147 and in the Swedish Aliens Ordinance.
148 
The Blue Card scheme in Sweden exists alongside the national labour immigration scheme; a national permit 
under the observance of the Swedish national collective agreements can be obtained for the validity of three 
months, whereas the Blue Card requires a work contract of one year.
149 
To obtain the Blue Card in Sweden, the third-country migrant must inter alia have: 
-  adequate and specific competence for the highly qualified employment in form of higher education 
qualifications (at least three years post-secondary higher education) or five years of professional 
experience relevant in the profession or sector specified in the employer’s job offer; 
-  a salary of at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in Sweden, irrespective of the type of highly 
qualified employment, amounting to 536,400 Swedish kronor [about €61,640]; the average salary of 
reference is 357,600 Swedish kronor [about €41,093] in 2012. The bill proposes that the Swedish 
Migration Board together with the Swedish National Mediation Office (the government body responsible 
for public statistics on wages and salaries) determines the salary threshold.
150 
Sweden has chosen not to make use of the option to introduce a lower salary threshold for certain 
particularly desirable professions as provided for in Article 5(5) of the Blue Card Directive.  
6. Key  Findings  and  Policy Suggestions 
The EU Blue Card Directive is the first European scheme introduced with the objective to attract highly 
qualified workers from outside the EU. The Blue Card Directive constitutes one key element for building an 
EU labour migration policy that aims to be demand-driven, forward-looking and in accordance with the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. Yet, the governments of Ireland, the UK and Denmark did not wish to participate in 
the Blue Card Directive. Since an agreement on a horizontal framework that would cover all third-country 
workers could not be reached, a sectoral approach was pursued from 2005 onwards. This paper explored how 
the understanding of ‘attractiveness’ of the EU Blue Card Directive has been shaped by the different EU 
decision-makers throughout the legislative process and implemented by the member states in the national 
legal systems. The analysis in this paper leads to the following key findings: 
First, it has been shown how the interests of the different institutional actors involved in the EU decision-
making process and the associated inter-institutional struggles have considerably compromised the 
‘attractiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive, and thus attainment of its objectives. The detailed analysis of the 
Council negotiations has demonstrated the dynamics in the decision-making process for various key 
provisions of the Blue Card Directive. Arguably, this process has resulted in an approach that has ignored the 
interests of businesses and the individual immigrants who still may have to face a slow and weighty 
bureaucracy. Indeed, there is no record that the opinions of other EU institutions, including the EESC and the 
European Parliament, have been taken into account by the Working Party on Migration and Expulsion during 
the Council negotiations.
151 This is particularly alarming in view of the compatibility of the Directive with 
                                                      
146 Government Bill (prop. 2012/13:148 Genomförande av blåkortsdirektivet).  
147 Aliens Act (SFS 2005:716). 
148 Aliens Ordinance (SFS 2006:97). 
149 Information obtained from the Swedish Ministry of Justice. 
150 See also website of the Swedish Migration Board on the EU Blue Card 
(www.migrationsverket.se/info/7557_en.html). 
151 Fridriksdóttir, B. (2013), “Negotiations on the Blue Card Directive in the Working Party on Migration and 
Expulsion”, in T. Strik and C. Grütters (eds), The Blue Card Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues, and 
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international and regional conventions (see below); the Treaty of Lisbon has brought a change in this respect 
by having extended the use of the ordinary legislative procedure providing the European Parliament with a 
stronger position.
152 There seems to have been a misconception by national governments of who is wanted on 
the member states’ labour markets seeing that only a specific group of people is targeted as evident from the 
definition of a ‘highly qualified’ worker in the Blue Card Directive: not only higher education qualifications 
or professional experience are decisive but also a bulk of admission criteria, including a salary requirement 
that varies from member state to member state.
153 It is unfortunate that the member states seemed incapable 
of moving beyond a restrictive, exclusionary approach when formulating the Blue Card Directive even 
though ‘highly skilled’ immigrants were supposedly a privileged target group. Rather than welcoming the 
latter immigrants, the member states’ positions appeared to be wary and distrustful.  
Second, the Blue Card Directive sets forth minimum standards providing for a common floor, not a common 
ceiling. The Commission’s vision of putting in place one common European admission system for highly 
qualified third-country workers with the Blue Card Directive was blocked in the Council. The Blue Card 
Directive has arguably not created common rules and the same level of rights for the migrants targeted: there 
are many possibilities for member states to introduce derogations. This is, in turn, reflected in the 
implementation of the Blue Card Directive into the national legal systems. The overview of the transposed 
Blue Card Directive in selected member states illustrates the divergence of the national rule, thereby making 
it difficult to identify the common denominator that the Blue Card Directive aimed to establish. The fact that 
member states could keep their national schemes for highly qualified immigrants is not conducive to – not to 
say undermine – a genuine European scheme and raises the question of the added value of the Blue Card 
Directive. While, in comparison, the Family Reunification and the Long-Term Residents’ Directives have 
substantially improved the legal situation of third-country nationals in the EU, it is hard to pinpoint a similar, 
concrete added value with regard to the Blue Card Directive. The use of the latter Directive remains optional 
and co-exists with the national schemes in place, including the member states’ bilateral conventions with 
selected third countries; put differently, the Directive does not remedy the potential existing competition 
among such schemes but contributes to creating a complex multi-layered system. Moreover, the duration of 
the Blue Card issued by the member states may vary significantly, from three months to four years. The Blue 
Card can thus be regarded as an upgraded national residence and work permit that has effectively increased 
the variable geometry of highly skilled labour schemes in the EU. 
Third, the element of intra-EU mobility was considered as vital from the very beginning for the Blue Card 
Directive. Instead of two years of legal residence, the member states agreed on an 18-month period after 
which the Blue Card holder would be entitled to move to a second member state. This facilitated option to 
move within the EU was a rather unexpected, positive outcome of the Council negotiations. But whether this 
possibility in fact makes more highly skilled migrant workers opt for the EU as a destination is not clear. In 
other words, “in order to be mobile within the EU, the Blue Card holder needs to be immobile for quite a 
while.”
154 The fact that the admission conditions have to be complied with for the second member state as 
well, which in addition can apply national quota, is unfortunate: intra-EU mobility can easily be hampered.
155 
The Commission underscored that one of the EU’s most attractive features compared to its competitors is the 
possibility of accessing 27 [now 28] labour markets. Indeed, the EU is not perceived as one European labour 
market today. However, the vision of such a European labour market could be realised in the future – and for 
this, the promotion of intra-EU mobility plays a fundamental role.  
Arguably, these first three findings demonstrate that the three elements that the Commission initially 
identified as weak points that detract from the EU’s attractiveness compared to other countries (namely 28 
different admission systems; the impossibility of moving easily from one country to another for work; and 
                                                      
152 Ibid., pp. 14-15.  
153 For a contrasting, detailed analysis on the concept of “low-skillness”, which is blurred and fuzzy on the EU and 
Member States’ levels as well, see L. Kureková, C., Haita and M. Beblavy (2013), Being and Becoming Low-Skilled: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Studying Low-Skillness, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.1, February 2013.  
154 T. De Lange (2013), “The EU Blue Card Directive: A Low Level of Trust in EU Labour Migration Regulation”, in 
T. Strik and C. Grütters (eds), The Blue Card Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues, and Implementation in 
Selected Member States, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 17-25 and p. 22. 
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lengthy and cumbersome procedures) are only to a very limited extent remedied by the Blue Card 
Directive.
156 
Fourth, the fact that highly qualified immigrants as defined under the Blue Card Directive enjoy a greater set 
of rights than other third-country workers raises questions about discrimination. How is this preferential 
treatment on the basis of higher education qualifications, professional experience and salary level compatible 
with the general principle of non-discrimination? The cause for differentiation lies in the sectoral approach 
that the EU pursued after it became clear that no compromise could be found for a horizontal approach in EU 
labour migration that is applicable to all third-country nationals. An EU immigration code could provide a 
framework to improve and consolidate EU migration law into one document, and tackle the currently very 
fragmented framework for EU migration law and policy. 
Fifth, the equal treatment for Blue Card holders is granted to nationals of the member state issuing the Blue 
Card in a number of specific areas. Provisions stipulating equality of treatment with regard to tax benefits 
and social assistance were dropped following an initiative from Germany, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
The evaluation of the implementation of the Blue Card Directive into member states’ legal systems is 
ongoing; the Commission report on the application of the Directive is scheduled for June 2014. The first 
experiences with the EU Blue Card in the member states differ: while the Blue Card was praised as a 
“success story” with about 8000 Blue Cards issued since August 2012 (by June 2013) in Germany, and is 
most likely to become the main permit for highly qualified immigrants, the impact of Blue Card has been 
much lower in other member states. For instance, in France, where only 50 Blue Cards have been issued in 
2012, the adoption of the Directive was assessed as a “political act” sought to improve the image of a 
“welcoming Europe.”
157 In a few years time it will be easier to assess how the legal transposition into 
member states’ systems operates in practice. On the assumption that the Blue Card scheme is maintained, its 
objective should be highlighted again: the creation of a flexible admission scheme that allows companies and 
businesses to recruit workers according to their concrete needs. Such a flexible admission scheme may, 
however, not come at the expense of the rights of the individual – in other words, a highly skilled labour 
system cannot place economic considerations above the interests and rights of migrants.
158 A Blue Card 
Directive that factors in business needs and is formulated in conformity with a rights-based approach 
considering the interests of those individuals to whom the measure applies, would enhance the 
‘attractiveness’ of the Blue Card Directive.
159  
This would include enhancing the level of rights for Blue Card Holders in relation to labour market access, 
equality of treatment, family reunification rights and long-term resident status. In this context, E. Guild 
pointed out that the Commission proposal was not in line with international standards such as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 97 as well as the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Legal Status of Migrant Workers.
160 This still holds true for the adopted Blue Card Directive. 
Specifically, the author highlighted that the ILO Convention and the Council of Europe Convention require 
equal treatment with own nationals in relation to accommodation and social security;
161 that the Council of 
Europe Convention prohibits binding the worker to the same employer or the same locality for a period 
                                                      
156 See European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637, 
23.10.2007, p. 3.  
157 Information obtained by means of interviews held with officials of the German and French Ministries of the Interior. 
158 S. Carrera and M. Formisano (2005), “An EU Approach to Labour Migration – What is the Added Value and the 
Way Ahead?”, CEPS Working Document No. 232, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, p. 14. 
159 On the challenges for a global rights-based EU approach to migration, see S. Carrera, A. Faure Atger, E. Guild and 
D. Kostakopoulou (2011), “Labour Immigration Policy in the EU: A Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020”, CEPS 
Working Paper No. 240, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, pp. 3-6. 
160 E. Guild (2011), “EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First Look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative”, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 145, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, pp. 5-6; ILO Convention No. 97 concerning 
Migration for Employment of 1 July 1949; European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers CETS No.: 
093 of 24 November 1977. 
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longer than one year
162 and that Article 12 of the latter Convention does not require sickness insurance for 
family reunion.
163 
Another weakness – thus providing room for improvement – relates to the fact that the Directive does not 
deal with the EU-wide, rather than national recognition of qualifications: there is no system in place that 
provides for the evaluation and recognition of qualifications obtained from higher education institutions 
situated in third countries.
164 Article 14(1)(d) of the Blue Card Directive stipulates equal treatment of Blue-
Card holders in comparison to nationals of the member state issuing the Blue Card, as regards: recognition of 
qualifications  in accordance with the relevant national procedures. 
In March 2013, the Commission put forward a proposal for a Recast Directive on students and researchers, 
which combines the current two Directives.
165 If the Commission considered a recast of the EU Blue Card 
Directive in the future, it would be important to mitigate the multiple inconsistencies that the Directive 
currently displays, while not lowering the existing standards. The Commission could consider introducing 
guidelines as to how the salary level could be harmonised. Moreover, an EU-wide scheme for highly 
qualified personnel replacing the member states’ national schemes should be taken into consideration. The 
EU Blue Card Directive is one piece of the puzzle, which should, once put together, constitute an EU labour 
migration policy that simply serves the purpose for which it was created: attracting third-country nationals 
with their skills and knowledge to the EU who enrich societies and states alike. 
 
                                                      
162 Article 8 of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. 
163 E. Guild (2011), “EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First Look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative”, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 145, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, pp. 5-6. 
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Migration and Law, 12: 435, p. 446. 
165 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of 
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ANNEX: Matrix on the Blue Card Directive 
  Commission Proposal of 23 October 
2007 
Positions of the Specified Member States   Adopted Version of the Blue Card Directive 
of 25 May 2009 
 
Article 2: 
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the purposes of this Directive: 
[…] 
(b) "highly qualified employment" means 
the exercise of genuine and effective work 
under the direction of someone else for 
which a person is paid and for which higher 
education qualifications or at least three 
years of equivalent professional experience 
is required; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 2008, document 
number: 5255/08: 
- […] the Cion underlined that point (b) has to be seen under 
the context of employment, insofar as it aims at defining the 
job and not the third-country nationals concerned […] 
- A large number of delegations entered scrutiny reservations 
on this provision, in particular on the criterion of at least 
three years of equivalent professional experience. DE, LV 
and AT drew attention to the risk of abuse in the assessment 
of the equivalent professional experience.[…] DE suggested 
the following draft: "highly qualified employment" means 
the exercise of genuine and effective work under the 
direction of someone else for which a person is paid and for 
which either higher education qualifications or both 
equivalent qualifications and least three years of professional 
experience is required. […]SE suggested deleting the word 
equivalent and introducing two different profiles of highly 
skilled workers, the first relating to the third-country national 
who possess higher education qualifications, and the second 
concerning those who have acquired the required 
professional experience. […]  
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, document 
number: 9666/08: 
- SE suggested the following wording for point b): "highly 
qualified employment" means the employment of any person 
who, in the member state concerned, is protected as an 
employee under national employment law and/or in 
accordance with the national practice, for which either higher 
education qualifications or qualified professional experience 
is required. 
 
For the purposes of this Directive: 
[…] 
(b) ‘highly qualified employment’ means the 
employment of a person who:  
— in the member state concerned, is protected as an 
employee under national employment law and/or in 
accordance with national practice, irrespective of the 
legal relationship, for the purpose of exercising 
genuine and effective work for, or under the 
direction of, someone else,  
— is paid, and,  
—has the required adequate and specific 
competence, as proven by higher professional 
qualifications; 
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Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- PT suggested amending the wording of this provision as 
follows: "highly qualified employment" means the exercise 
of genuine and effective work under the direction of 
someone else for which a person is paid and for adequate and 
specific technical competence, resulting from higher 
education qualifications or at least five years of relevant 
professional experience is required. 
  (g) "higher education qualification" stands 
for any degree, diploma or other certificate 
issued by a competent authority attesting the 
successful completion of a higher education 
programme, namely a set of courses 
provided by an educational 
establishment recognised as a higher 
education institution by the State in which it 
is situated. These qualifications are taken 
into account, for the purposes of this 
directive, on condition that the studies 
needed to acquire them lasted at least three 
years; 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 2008, document 
number: 5255/08: 
- CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IT, MT, LT, LV, NL and AT 
entered scrutiny reservations on point (h), linked in 
particular with the concerns expressed in relation with point 
(b) with regard to the period of professional experience. 
According to PL, the duration of the period of professional 
experience should be of at least five years. 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, document 
number: 9666/08: 
- In the framework of the examination of this provision, the 
idea of an aptitude test aimed at assessing the professional 
experience of the person concerned was also considered, 
which was not, however supported by the Working Party. 
[…] NL and SE did not support the increase in the number of 
years of professional experience from three - as envisaged in 
the original Cion proposal - to five years. 
- According to BE, DE, EE, LI, LV and AT, this definition 
should focus on the educational qualifications and not on the 
professional experience 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- AT suggested replacing or with and 
- […] DE suggested deleting the words or of at least three 
(h) ‘higher education qualification’ means any 
diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal 
qualifications issued by a competent authority 
attesting the successful completion of a post-
secondary higher education programme, namely a set 
of courses provided by an educational establishment 
recognised as a higher education institution by the 
State in which it is situated. For the purposes of this 
Directive, a higher education qualification shall be 
taken into account, on condition that the studies 
needed to acquire it lasted at least three years; 
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years of equivalent professional experience. 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 24 July 2008, document 
number: 11512/08: 
- Recalling the special needs, particularly of the area of the 
information technology, the Cion stressed the importance of 
maintaining, even if only as a subsidiary possibility, the 
criterion of the professional experience. The Pres. also felt 
that it would be important not to exclude such a possibility, 
in order to make the proposal more attractive for highly 
qualified third-country nationals 
  (h) "higher professional qualifications" 
means qualifications attested by evidence of 
higher education qualifications or of at least 
three years of equivalent professional 
experience; 
[…] 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 18 January 2008, document 
number: 5255/08: 
- […] concerning the expression recognised as a higher 
education institution by the State in which it is situated, the 
Cion pointed out that this definition aims at covering all the 
post-secondary education, in accordance with the Bologna 
classification. 
(g) ‘higher professional qualifications’ means 
qualifications attested by evidence of higher 
education qualifications or, by way of derogation, 
when provided for by national law, attested by at 
least five years of professional experience of a level 
comparable to higher education qualifications and 
which is relevant in the profession or sector specified 
in the work contract or binding job offer; 
 
Article 12: 
Labour 
market 
access 
 
(Article 13 in the Commission proposal) 
1. For the first two years of legal residence 
in the member state concerned as holder of 
an EU Blue Card, access to the labour 
market for the person concerned shall be 
restricted to the exercise of paid 
employment activities which meet the 
conditions for 
admission set out in Articles 5 and 6. 
Modifications of the terms of the work 
contract that affect the conditions for 
admission or changes in the work 
relationship shall be subject to the prior 
authorisation in writing of the competent 
authorities of the member state of residence, 
according to national procedures and within 
the time limits set out in Article 12(1). 
2. After the first two years of legal residence 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- ES suggested providing for a deadline of one year, rather 
than two years, in paragraphs 1 and 2… 
- NL, supported by FR, felt that it should not be necessary to 
require a prior authorisation, as long as the person concerned 
continues to fulfil the conditions set by the proposal. For this 
reason it suggested the following wording: either subject to a 
prior authorisation or to a notification in writing to the 
competent authorities of the member state of residence 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 April 2008, document 
number: 7642/08: 
- Pointing out that, under Article 14, the persons concerned 
are allowed to legally reside in the territory of a member 
state in a situation of temporary unemployment for a period 
not exceeding three months, DE, supported by AT, suggested 
1. For the first two years of legal employment in the 
member state concerned as an EU Blue Card holder, 
access to the labour market for the person concerned 
shall be restricted to the exercise of paid 
employment activities which meet the conditions for 
admission set out in Article 5. After these first two 
years, member states may grant the persons 
concerned equal treatment with nationals as regards 
access to highly qualified employment.  
2. For the first two years of legal employment in the 
member state concerned as an EU Blue Card holder, 
changes in employer shall be subject to the prior 
authorisation in writing of the competent authorities 
of the member state of residence, in accordance with 
national procedures and within the time limits set out 
in Article 11(1). Modifications that affect the 
conditions for admission shall be subject to prior 
communication or, if provided for by national law, 
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in the member state concerned as holder of 
an EU Blue Card, the person concerned 
shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as 
regards access to highly qualified 
employment. The holder of the EU Blue 
Card shall notify changes in his/her work 
relationship to the competent authorities of 
the member state of residence, according to 
national procedures. 
[...] 
replacing the word residence with employment both in 
paragraph 2 and in the first sentence of paragraph 1 
  
the member state concerned does not make use of the 
possibility provided for in paragraph 1 regarding 
equal treatment, the person concerned shall, in 
accordance with national procedures, communicate 
changes that affect the conditions of Article 5 to the 
competent authorities of the member state of 
residence.  
[...] 
Article 14: 
Equal 
Treatment 
(Article 15 in the Commission proposal) 
1. Holders of an EU Blue Card shall enjoy 
equal treatment with nationals at least as 
regards: 
[...] 
 (b) freedom of association and affiliation 
and membership of an organisation 
representing workers or employers or of any 
organisation whose members are engaged in 
a specific occupation, including the benefits 
conferred by such organisations, without 
prejudice to the national provisions on 
public policy and public security; 
(c) education and vocational training, 
including study grants in accordance with 
national law; 
[...] 
 (f) social assistance as defined by national 
law; 
(g) payment of acquired pensions when 
moving to a third country; 
(h) tax benefits; 
(i) access to goods and services and the 
supply of goods and services made available 
to the public, including procedures for 
obtaining housing and the assistance 
afforded by employment offices; 
[...] 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- DE entered a scrutiny reservation on this provision 
[referring to paragraph 1 point c of the proposal]. Several 
delegations felt that the notion of study grants to which this 
provision refers should be clarified… 
- CZ suggested deleting this provision [referring to 
paragraph 1 point f of the proposal], for reasons of 
subsidiarity. HU suggested deleting point (f) 
- [With regard to paragraph 1 point g of the proposal] SE 
suggested the following addition: payment of income-based 
acquired pensions when moving to a third country. CZ, 
which evoked the principle of subsidiarity, as well as HU and 
AT, suggested deleting point (g). 
- [referring to paragraph 1 point (i) of the proposal] DE and 
FI, supported by AT, suggested limiting the assistance to be 
provided by employment offices to information and 
counselling services. 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, document 
number: 9666/08: 
- ES suggested introducing in point (b) a reference to the 
right to strike. AT opposed the ES suggestion  
- CZ and DE maintained reservations and NL maintained a 
scrutiny reservation on point (g) [(h) of the proposal]. DE, 
supported by CZ, suggested deleting this provision 
- DE suggested revising the text of paragraph 2 as follows: 
1. EU Blue Card holders shall enjoy equal treatment 
with nationals of the member state issuing the Blue 
Card, as regards:  
[...] 
  (b) freedom of association and affiliation and 
membership of an organisation representing workers 
or employers or of any organisation whose members 
are engaged in a specific occupation, including the 
benefits conferred by such organisations, without 
prejudice to the national provisions on public policy 
and public security;  
(c) education and vocational training;  
[...] 
  (f) without prejudice to existing bilateral 
agreements, payment of income-related acquired 
statutory pensions in respect of old age, at the rate 
applied by virtue of the law of the debtor member 
state(s) when moving to a third country;  
(g) access to goods and services and the supply of 
goods and services made available to the public, 
including procedures for obtaining housing, as well 
as information and counselling services afforded by 
employment offices;  
[...] 
2. With respect to paragraph 1(c) and (g) the member 
state concerned may restrict equal treatment as 
regards study and maintenance grants and loans or 
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2. member states may restrict the rights 
conferred under paragraphs 1(c) and (i) in 
respect to study grants and procedures for 
obtaining public housing to cases where the 
holder of the EU Blue Card has been staying 
or has the right to stay in its territory for at 
least three years. 
3. member states may restrict equal 
treatment as regards social assistance to 
cases where the holder of the EU Blue Card 
has been granted EC long-term resident 
status in accordance with Article 17. 
 
 
 
In relation to Article 1 (c), member states may restrict access 
to education and vocational training, including study grants 
in accordance with national law…SE suggested introducing 
the following new sub-paragraph in paragraph 2: With 
respect to the provisions in paragraph 1, point (c) the 
member state  
concerned may restrict equal treatment to cases where the 
registered or usual place of business of the EU Blue Card 
holder, or that of family members for whom he/she claims 
benefits, lies within the territory of the Member state 
concerned. 
higher education and vocational training, and 
procedures for obtaining housing. With respect to 
paragraph 1(c):  
(a) access to university and post-secondary education 
may be subject to specific prerequisites in 
accordance with national law;  
(b) the member state concerned may restrict equal 
treatment to cases where the registered or usual place 
of residence of the EU Blue Card holder, or that of 
the family member for whom benefits are claimed, 
lies within its territory.  
 [...] 
4. When the EU Blue Card holder moves to a second 
member state in accordance with Article 18 and a 
positive decision on the issuing of an EU Blue Card 
has not yet been taken, member states may limit 
equal treatment in the areas listed in paragraph 1, 
with the exception of 1(b) and (d). If, during this 
period, member states allow the applicant to work, 
equal treatment with nationals of the second member 
state in all areas of paragraph 1 shall be granted. 
 
Article 15: 
Family 
Members 
(Article 16 in the Commission proposal) 
1. Council Directive 2003/86/EC shall apply 
with the derogations laid down in this 
Article. 
2. By way of derogation from Articles 3(1) 
and 8 of Directive 2003/86/EC, family 
reunification shall not be made dependent 
on the requirement of the holder of the EU 
Blue Card having reasonable prospects of 
obtaining the right of permanent residence 
and of he/she having a minimum period of 
residence. 
3. By way of derogation from Article 5(4), 
first subparagraph, of Directive 2003/86/EC, 
residence permits for family members shall 
be granted at the latest within six months 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- BE, DE, EE, EL, FI, AT and SE expressed concerns on the 
deadline provided for in this provision [paragraph 3 of the 
proposal]. DE, supported by SE, preferred not to set any 
deadline at all and to simply state that the residence permits 
of the family members should be issued as soon as possible. 
According to FI, the residence permits for Blue Card holders 
and their family members should be issued in the same 
timeframe  
- HU suggested amending the text of paragraph 3 as follows: 
By way of derogation from Article 5(4), first subparagraph, 
of Directive 2003/86/EC, the competent authorities of the 
member states shall give written notification of the decision 
as soon as possible and in any event no later than residence 
permits for family members shall be granted at the latest 
1. Directive 2003/86/EC shall apply with the 
derogations laid down in this Article.  
2. By way of derogation from Articles 3(1) and 8 of 
Directive 2003/86/EC, family reunification shall not 
be made dependent on the requirement of the EU 
Blue Card holder having reasonable prospects of 
obtaining the right of permanent residence and 
having a minimum period of residence.  
3. By way of derogation from the last subparagraph 
of Article 4(1) and Article 7(2) of Directive 
2003/86/EC, the integration conditions and measures 
referred to therein may only be applied after the 
persons concerned have been granted family 
reunification. 4. By way of  derogation from the first 
subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Directive 
2003/86/EC, residence permits for family members 
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from the date on which the application was 
lodged. 
4. By way of derogation from Articles 4(1), 
last subparagraph, and 7(2) of Directive 
2003/86/EC, the integration measures 
referred to therein may only be applied after 
the persons concerned have been  granted 
family reunification. 
5. By way of derogation from Article 14(2) 
of Directive 2003/86/EC and in respect of 
access to the labour market, member states 
shall not apply the time limit of 12 months. 
6. By way of derogation to Article 15(1) of 
Directive 2003/86/EC, for the purposes of 
calculation of the five years of residence 
required for the acquisition of an 
autonomous residence permit, residence in 
different member states may be cumulated. 
7. If member states have recourse to the 
option provided for in paragraph 6, the 
provisions set out in Article 17 in respect of 
accumulation of periods of residence in 
different member states by the holder of an 
EU Blue Card shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
within six months from the date on which the application 
was lodged 
- In reply to the remarks from the delegations, the 
Commission noted that the choice of setting a short deadline 
from the lodging of the application to the residence permit 
being issued for family members is a political one, based on 
the intention to attract highly skilled third-country nationals. 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, document 
number: 9666/08: 
- BE suggested deleting this provision 
- [Concerning paragraph 3 of the proposal] DE and FI 
suggested replacing the words at the latest within six months 
with as soon as possible. 
- AT, which entered a reservation on paragraph 4 [of the 
proposal], suggested deleting this provision. 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 24 July 2008, document 
number: 11512/08: 
- BE, DE, AT and SE maintained reservations on Article 16. 
FI pointed out that the Blue Card holder and his/her family 
members should be admitted at the same time. BE queried 
the added value of this provision. 
 
reunification are fulfilled, at the latest within six 
months from the date on which the application was 
lodged.  
4. By way of derogation from the first subparagraph 
of Article 5(4) of Directive 2003/86/EC, residence 
permits for family members shall be granted, where 
the conditions for family reunification are fulfilled, 
at the latest within six months from the date on 
which the application was lodged. 
5. By way of derogation from Article 13(2) and (3) 
of Directive 2003/86/EC, the duration of validity of 
the residence permits of family members shall be the 
same as that of the residence permits issued to the 
EU Blue Card holder insofar as the period of validity 
of their travel documents allows it.  
6. By way of derogation from the second sentence of 
Article 14(2) of Directive 2003/86/EC, member 
states shall not apply any time limit in respect of 
access to the labour market. This paragraph is 
applicable from 19 December 2011.  
7. By way of derogation to Article 15(1) of Directive 
2003/86/EC, for the purposes of calculation of the 
five years of residence required for the acquisition of 
an autonomous residence permit, residence in 
different member states may be cumulated.  
8. If member states have recourse to the option 
provided for in paragraph 7, the provisions set out in 
Article 16 of this Directive in respect of 
accumulation of periods of residence in different 
member states by the EU Blue Card holder shall 
apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
Article 16: 
EC long-
term resident 
status for EU 
Blue Card 
holders 
(Article 17 in the Commission proposal) 
1. Directive 2003/109/EC shall apply with 
the derogations laid down in this Article. 
2. By way of derogation from Article 4(1) of 
Directive 2003/109/EC, the holder of an EU 
Blue Card having made use of the 
possibility provided for in Article 19 is 
allowed to cumulate periods of residence in 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- Several delegations underlined that the implementation of 
this provision, which introduces a series of derogations to 
Directive 2003/109/EC, could give rise to quite a complex 
system, difficult to be managed by the national 
administrations, in particular with respect to the issue of 
1. Directive 2003/109/EC shall apply with the 
derogations laid down in this Article.  
2. By way of derogation from Article 4(1) of 
Directive 2003/109/EC, the EU Blue Card holder 
having made use of the possibility provided for in 
Article 18 of this Directive is allowed to cumulate 
periods of residence in different member states in 
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  different member states in order to fulfil the 
requirement concerning the duration of 
residence, if the following conditions are 
met: 
(a) five years of legal and continuous 
residence within the territory of the 
Community as holder of an EU Blue Card; 
(b) legal and continuous residence as holder 
of an EU Blue Card within the territory of 
the member state where the application for 
the long-term resident's 
EC residence permit is lodged for two years 
immediately prior to the submission of the 
relevant application. 
3. For the purpose of calculating the period 
of legal and continuous residence in the 
Community and by way of derogation from 
Article 4(3), first subparagraph, of Directive 
2003/109/EC, periods of absence from the 
territory of the Community shall 
not interrupt the period referred to in 
paragraph 2(a) and shall be taken into 
account for its calculation if they are shorter 
than 12 consecutive months and do not 
exceed in total 16 months within the period 
referred to in paragraph 2(a). This paragraph 
shall apply also in cases where the holder of 
an EU Blue Card has not made use of the 
possibility provided for in Article 19. 
4. By way of derogation from Article 
9(1)(c) of Directive 2003/109/EC, member 
states shall extend the period of absence 
allowed to an EU Blue Card holder and of 
his/her family members having been granted 
the EC long-term residence status from the 
territory of the Community to 24 
consecutive months. 
5. The derogations to Directive 
2003/109/EC set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 
shall apply only in cases where the third-
absences (paragraph 3). CZ, which felt that introducing these 
kinds of exceptions does not contribute to the clarity and 
simplicity of the system in general, considers that once they 
fulfil the conditions of Directive 2003/109/EC, Blue Card 
holders should enjoy the same treatment of long-term 
residents, with respect also to absences. CZ suggested either 
entirely deleting Article 17 or maintaining paragraphs 1 and 
2, while deleting the rest of the provision (and in particular 
paragraph 5). AT also suggested deleting the entire provision. 
According to HU, rather than targeting Blue Card holders 
who have acquired long-term resident status, the provisions 
of paragraphs 3 and 4 should apply all long-term residents, 
having regard to the objective of fostering circular migration 
and also on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination 
- DE suggested a deadline of six years instead of five years 
[concerning paragraph 2(a)] 
- While supporting the objective of fostering circular 
migration, DE preferred not to derogate to the provisions of 
Article 4(3) of the long-term residents Directive […] 
- Making reference to Article 9(2) of the long-term residents 
Directive - according to which member states may provide 
that absences exceeding 12 consecutive months or for 
specific or exceptional reasons shall not entail withdrawal or 
loss of status – ES, supported by BE, suggested deleting 
paragraph 4. The Cion noted that Article 9(2) of the long-
term residents Directive is an optional provision, while 
paragraph 4 is a compulsory one and for this reason it 
preferred maintaining it. 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings – 
Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, 1 August 2008, 
document number: 12320/08: 
- According to DE the deadline for acquiring long-term 
resident status should be increased from two to three years 
[paragraph 2(b)]. 
 
duration of residence, if the following conditions are 
met:  
(a) five years of legal and continuous residence 
within the territory of the Community as an EU Blue 
Card holder; and  
(b) legal and continuous residence for two years 
immediately prior to the submission of the relevant 
application as an EU Blue Card holder within the 
territory of the member state where the application 
for the long-term resident's EC residence permit is 
lodged.  
3. For the purpose of calculating the period of legal 
and continuous residence in the Community and by 
way of derogation from the first subparagraph of 
Article 4(3) of Directive 2003/109/EC, periods of 
absence from the territory of the Community shall 
not interrupt the period referred to in paragraph 2(a) 
of this Article if they are shorter than 12 consecutive 
months and do not exceed in total 18 months within 
the period referred to in paragraph 2(a) of this 
Article. This paragraph shall apply also in cases 
where the EU Blue Card holder has not made use of 
the possibility provided for in Article 18. 
4. By way of derogation from Article 9(1)(c) of 
Directive 2003/109/EC, member states shall extend 
to 24 consecutive months the period of absence from 
the territory of the Community which is allowed to 
an EC long-term resident holder of a long-term 
residence permit with the remark referred to in 
Article 17(2) of this Directive and of his family 
members having been granted the EC long-term 
resident status.  
5. The derogations to Directive 2003/109/EC set out 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article may be 
restricted to cases where the third-country national 
concerned can present evidence that he has been 
absent from the territory of the Community to 
exercise an economic activity in an employed or 
self-employed capacity, or to perform a voluntary 
service, or to study in his own country of origin. 6. 
Article 14(1)(f) and 15 shall continue to apply for ASSESSING THE ‘ATTRACTIVENESS’ OF THE EU’S BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE FOR ‘HIGHLY QUALIFIED’ IMMIGRANTS | 33 
 
country national concerned can present 
evidence that he/she has been absent from 
the territory of the Community to exercise 
an economic activity in an employed or self-
employed capacity, or to perform a 
voluntary service, or to study in his/her own 
country of origin. 
6. Articles 13, 15 and 16 shall continue to 
apply, where applicable, after the holder of 
the EU Blue Card has been issued a 
residence permit pursuant to Article 18. 
 
holders of a long-term residence permit with the 
remark referred to in Article 17(2), where applicable, 
after the EU Blue Card holder has become an EC 
long-term resident.  
 
Article 18: 
Conditions 
for residence 
in other 
Member 
States 
(Article 19 in the Commission proposal) 
1. After two years of legal residence in the 
first member state as holder of an EU Blue 
Card, the person concerned and his/her 
family members shall be allowed to move to 
a member state other than the first member 
state for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment under the conditions set out in 
this Article. 
2. No later than one month after entering the 
territory of the second member state, the 
holder of the EU Blue Card shall notify 
his/her presence to the competent authorities 
of that member state and present all the 
documents proving that he/she fulfils the 
conditions set out in Articles 5 and 6 for the 
second member state. 
[...] 
5. In application of this Article, member 
states may continue to apply volumes of 
admission as specified in Article 7. 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 8 May 2008, document 
number: 8249/08: 
- SE suggested reducing the deadline to one year… 
 
Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings – Working Party 
on Migration and Expulsion, 19 June 2008, document 
number: 9666/08: 
- BE maintained a reservation on this provision. Pointing out 
that, in its view, the only added value of Article 19 is the 
possibility for the person concerned to submit an application 
when he/she is residing in the first member state, BE 
suggested replacing this provision with a clause along these 
lines. HU supported the BE position. DE and AT felt that the 
person concerned should notify his/her intention to move to 
another member state when he/she is still in the first member 
state.  
- NL did not support the two year deadline. ES suggested 
replacing the two year deadline with a time-period of one 
year. 
1. After eighteen months of legal residence in the 
first member state as an EU Blue Card holder, the 
person concerned and his family members may move 
to a member state other than the first member state 
for the purpose of highly qualified employment 
under the conditions set out in this Article.  
2. As soon as possible and no later than one month 
after entering the territory of the second member 
state, the EU Blue Card holder and/or his employer 
shall present an application for an EU Blue Card to 
the competent authority of that member state and 
present all the documents proving the fulfilment of 
the conditions set out in Article 5 for the second 
member state. The second member state may decide, 
in accordance with national law, not to allow the 
applicant to work until the positive decision on the 
application has been taken by its competent 
authority. 
3. The application may also be presented to the 
competent authorities of the second member state 
while the EU Blue Card holder is still residing in the 
territory of the first member state.  
[...] 
7. In application of this Article, member states may 
continue to apply volumes of admission as referred 
to in Article 6.  
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